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BUYERS' LIABILITY FOR PRICE DISCRIMINATIONS UNDER
ROBINSON-PATMAN*
EITHER buyers or sellers may run afoul of the Robinson-Patman Act's pro-
hibition against price discrimination.' To establish a prima facie case of price
discrimination against a vendor, the FTC need only show that one customer
received a lower price than another,2 resulting in possible injury to competi-
tion.3 The seller then may defend by proving either that his offending price
was set in good faith to meet a competitor's lower price,4 or that the price
differential was justified by cost savings.5 But the FTC has insisted that the
*Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
1. The Act deals separately with buyers, 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f)
(1946), and sellers, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §13(a) (1946). Under these sub-
sections, the FTC has proceeded against approximately twelve times as many sellers as
buyers. Rowe, Price Discriminatio, Competition, and Confusion: Another Look at
Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 941 n.72 (1951). The primary purpose of the Act
was to curb large buyers. See 80 CONG. RFc. 6287, 8109-11 (1936); PATmAN, Tutr
ROBINSON-PAIAN AcT c. 1 (1938).
2. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 44-5 (1948) ; Chicago Sugar Co. v. Ameri-
can Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1, 7 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1950); A. J.
Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D. Mass. 1949).
3. Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945); FTC v. Morton
Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948); American Can Co. v. Russellville Canning Co., 191
F.2d 38, 54 (8th Cir. 1951) (freight equalization which "conceivably might substantially
lessen competition" held violation).
The other elements of the FTC case against a seller are indicated by the statutory
language at 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946) :
"Sec. 2(a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in
the course of such commerce. . . , to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities of like grade and quality where either or any of the
purchases involved ... are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for
use, consumption or resale ... and where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. . . , or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or
knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with the customers of
either of them."
4. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946):
"(b) ... Provided, however That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller
rebutting the prima facie case.., by showing that his lower price... was made
in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor ......
This proviso is an absolute defense. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
5. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1946) :
"Sec. 2(a) . . . Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differ-
entials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufac-
ture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which
such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered."
Although another proviso in the subsection allows differentials if justified by changed
market conditions, this defense is rarely used. See, e.g., Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190
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cost-justification defense reach almost impossible standards of precision.G
Approximate cost allocations are unsatisfactory; generally only a full field
study will be accepted.7 The FTC has also required buyers to assume the
rigorous burden of proving that their receipt of a lower price was justified by
the seller's lower costs.8 However, the statutory language provides that
buyers violate the Act only if they "knowingly" induce or receive "prohibited"
price discrimination.9 Purchasers therefore argued that this shifted the burden
of proof and that a price differential was not a "prohibited" price discrimina-
tion until the Commission proved it to be unjustified.10 And buyers further
contended that the FTC must satisfy the "knowingly" language by showing
that the purchaser knew his price was unjustified. 1
The recent case of Automatic Cantcen Co. of Amewrica v. FTC '- was the
first proceeding against a buyer to reach the Supreme Court.13 The Com-
F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1952) (boycott nct a sufficient
change in market conditions); Frederick W. Huber, Inc. v. Pillsbury Flour 'Mills Co.,
30 F. Supp. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (changed marketability of fljur a defense).
6. For representative cases and criticism of FTC demands, see Sawyer, Accoarntinj
and Statistical Proof in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 Iowv. L Rmv. 244 (1951); Note,
Proof of Cost Differentials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 65 HAv. L RL'V. 1011
(1952).
7. Only two sellers have ever successfully established a cost saving defense before
the FTC. Bird & Son, Inc., 25 F.T.C. 548 (1937) ; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rcv'd on other grounds, 191 F.2d 736 (7th Cir. 1951), ccrt. dis-
nissed as untinely, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). For a statement of the FTC psition, see Case
Studies in Distribution Cost Accounting for Manufacturing and Wholesaling, H.R. Dc.
No. 287, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Jls-
tification of Price and Scrzice Diffcrentials Under the Robinson-Patnman Act, 30 Tr..'-:s
L. RE v. 1 (1951); Warmack, Cost Accounting Problems Under the Robinson-Patman
Act in CCH ROBINsoN-PkT.mAN Acr SYvuPosIum 105 (1947).
8. See E. J. Brach & Sons, 39 F.T.C. 535, 547 (1944) ; Automatic Canteen Co. of
America, 46 F.T.C. S61, 396 (1950). See Forkner, The Significance of Section 2f) in
CCH RoBiNsoN-PATmAN Acr Syxosium 66, 78 (1948).
9. 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1946) :
"(f) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in
price which is prohibited by this section."
10. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 27-9, Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC,
346 U.S. 61 (1953) ; Brief for FTC, p. 19, Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC,
194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952) (summarizing the Ainicus Curiae argument of the Atlas
Supply Co.); Howrey, The Buyer and A Prima Face Case in CCH Rozmsom.-PA.-&,u:z
Acr Symposium 87, 38-91 (1948).
11. Ibid.
12. 346 U.S.61 (1953).
13. The FTC has brought eighteen cases against buyers under 2(f) since the passage
of the Act, of which only Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950), has
been reviewed by the courts. Of these, twelve have been decided, all against the buyer,
and cease and desist orders issued: Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 F.T.C. 1228 (1937) ;
Golf Ball Manufacturers' Ass'n, 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938) ; Miami Wholesale Drug Corp., 28
F.T.C. 485 (1939); American Oil Co. and General Finance, Inc., 29 F.T.C. 357 (1939);
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pany, a purchaser of candy for resale through automatic machines, solicited
and received lower than list prices from eighty of its suppliers.14 The FTC
considered a prima facie case established by a showing that the buyer knew
it was receiving lower than list prices. 15 But the Company insisted that the
Commission prove knowing acceptance of an unjustified price.10 The FTC
refused to introduce evidence indicating a lack of cost justification, and issued
a cease and desist order.1 7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed.' 8  The Supreme
Court, in a six to three decision, held the FTC's showing insufficient.' 9 Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, for the majority, ruled that the Commission must present
some evidence indicating that the price was unjustified and also that the buyer
knew of this unjustifiability.20 The court reasoned on a "balance of con-
venience" theory that the FTC, with its broad power to investigate and sub-
poena seller's cost data, could obtain this information more easily than the
buyer.21 Furthermore, the majority feared that making acceptance of lower
than list prices a prima facie violation of the Act would unduly restrict
vigorous bargaining by buyers. 22 While Automatic Canteen clearly told the
Commission to show more, it did not specify how much more evidence was
required.
A. S. Aloe Co., 34 F.T.C. 363 (1941); Atlantic City Wholesale Drug Co., 38 F.T.C. 631
(1944) ; E. J. Brach & Sons, 39 F.T.C. 535 (1944) ; Associated Merchandising Corp., 40
F.T.C. 578 (1945) ; The Curtiss Candy Co. of America, 44 F.T.C. 237 (1947), nodified,
48 F.T.C. 161 (1951) ; National Tea Co., 46 F.T.C. 829 (1950) ; Automatic Canteen Co.
of America, 46 F.T.C. 861 (1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 346 U.S. 61
(1953) ; Atlas Supply Co., 48 F.T.C. 53 (1951). Three complaints have been dismissed:
The Kroger Co., FTC Dkt. 5991, CCH TRADE REG. REP. ff 11,450 (June 24, 1953) (initial
decision adopted by the Commission, Sept. 16, 1953; mimeographed copy in Yale Law
Library); Crown Zellerbach Corp., FTC Dkt. 5421, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 11,466 (July
8, 1953); Safeway Stores, Inc., FTC Dkt. 5990, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11,474 (July
27, 1953). And three complaints are pending: Metropolitan Automotive Wholesalers Co-
operative, FTC Dkt. 5720-4, CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 11,501 (complaint issued Dec. 20,
1949); Sylvania Electric Products, FTC Dkt. 5728, CCH TRADE REG. RzE. 1 11,501 (com-
plaint issued Dec. 21, 1949); Mid-South Distributors, FTC Dkt. 5766-70, CCH Taidrn
REG. REP. 11,503 (complaint issued May 1, 1950). For a discussion of these cases see
Drain, A Buyer's View of the Robinson-Patinzan Act, 16 J. BAR Ass'N, D.C. 245 (1949).
14. Automatic Canteen Co. of America, 46 F.T.C. 861, 895 (1950).
15. Id. at 896.
16. For the Company's argument, see note 10 supra.
17. 46 F.T.C. 861, 889-91 (1950).
18. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 194 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1952). The
Seventh Circuit accepted the FTC's theory analogizing buyers' to sellers' suits. Id. at 438.
19. The majority indicated that Section 2(b) of the Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15
U.S.C. § 13(b) (1946), which places the burden of showing justification upon the "person
charged with a violation," applied only to proceedings against sellers. Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 77-8 (1953). Justices Black, Douglas, and Reed
dissented on the ground that 2(b) justified the Commission's stand. Id. at 82-3.
20. Id. at 79.
21. Id. at 78-9.
22. Id. at 73-4.
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Automatic Canteen did not decide whether the FTC has to negate all the
seller's defenses or only cost justification. Some broad language in the opinion
says that the Commission must show lack of any justification for the price.P
And two recent FTC opinions dismissing complaints against buyers apparent-
ly interpret Automatic Canteen to require that all defenses be negated by the
Commission.2 4 However, the Supreme Court confined its decision almost
entirely to cost justification.2 ' And the Court pointed out that a buyer might
be in a better position than the FTC to know whether a price was set to meet
another seller's competition.20 On a "balance of convenience," therefore, the
Commission should not be required to disprove the good faith meeting of
competition defense to make out its case.
Even if Automatic Canteen requires the Commission to refute only the cost
defense, the opinion does not decide whether the FTC must introduce a full
field survey for this purpose. An FTC hearing examiner has recently inter-
preted Automatic Canteen to require such a full-scale showing.27  Some
reasoning in the Supreme Court's opinion supports such a view.2 But it
is uncertain whether the investigatory power of that agency is broad enough
to allow so complete a survey of a seller's business.2 0 Nor would joining
sellers and their customers in one proceeding help the FTC secure an exact
cost study to use against buyers. The Commission cannot require that a
seller undertake such an expensive study., And even if the seller undertakes
the complex project to defend against an FTC complaint, the Commission
will probably reject it as inadequate. 3 ' Thus, requiring the Commission to
23. Id. at 74. "'Ve therefore conclude that a buyer is not liable under §2(f) if the
lower prices he induces are... within one of the seller's defenses. . ."
24. See Safeway Stores, Inc., FTC Dk-t 5930, CCH TRDE REO;. RP. ff 11,474 (July
27, 1953); The Kroger Co., FTC Dkt. 5991, CCH TRADE RrG. REP. 11,450 (June 24,
1953) (initial decision adopted by the Commission, Sept. 16, 1953; mimeographed copy
in Yale Law Library).
25. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 79-S0 (1953).
26. Id. at 79 n23.
27. See Crown Zellerbach Corp., Zellerbach Paper Co., General Paper Co., FTC
Dkt. 5421, CCII TRADE Rno. REP. 1 11,466 (July 8, 1953). However, the full Commission
has not yet considered this question.
28. The Court discussed the full field study required of sellers, Automatic Canteen
Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68-9 (1953), and subsequently indicated that the
FTC must now disprove cost justification. Id. at 79.
29. Although this issue has never been litigated, such a survey might be held too
sweeping and unreasonable. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 333 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
But cf. FTC v. Smith, 34 F.2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (FTC has wide subpoena powers).
Even if the FTC has power to make the study, its cost would be prohibitive. Sawyer,
Accounting and Statistical Proof in Price Discrimination Cases, 36 Iowa L Run. 244,
253 (1951).
30. Cost justification is an affirmative defense which need not be undertaken by the
seller. See, e.g., Monolith Portland Cement Co., 47 F.T.C. 1292, 1293 (1951); Ideal
Cement Co., 47 F.T.C. 221, 227 (1950) ; Draper Corp., 43 F.T.C. 480, 4S6 (1947).
31. See notes 6, 7 mipra.
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produce a full field study would for practical purposes end enforcement of
the Act against buyers.
Automatic Canteen can reasonably be read to require that the FTC show
only approximate lack of cost justification. The majority indicates that the
Commission need introduce no cost data when the buyer knew of identical
purchases by competitors at substantially higher prices . 2 Requiring a full
field study in such a case would be clearly unnecessary. A full cost study
seems equally unnecessary where the buyer's competitors pay a substantially
higher price for only slightly different purchases. Of course, if quantities
purchased and distribution methods vary considerably, or if the price reduc-
tion is moderate, courts will probably insist on a more detailed FTC showing
on the cost-justification issue. Varying the FTC's burden with the facts of
particular cases conforms with the Supreme Court's policy of giving buyers
room to bargain,33 while leaving the Commission practical means to attack
flagrant abuses of bargaining power . 4
Permitting the FTC to introduce only approximate cost data is particularly
reasonable, since Antonwtic Canteen apparently requires the Commission to
refute the cost defense solely as a component of showing the buyer's probable
knowledge of unjustifiability.3 5 Automatic Canteen indicates that the Com-
mission may infer constructive knowledge if a reasonable businessman should
know that cost savings would probably not justify a price difference.80 The
reasonable businessman has available only approximate cost data, gathered
from trade experience.3 7 Since Automatic Canteen makes buyer's knowledge
the crucial element of the FTC's case, 8 it seems unnecessary to require a
refined survey to refute cost justification. The FTC should have to introduce
only the rough cost data of which the buyer would have been aware.80
32. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 80 (1953).
33. Id. at 73-4.
34. Id. at 70, 79.
35. For such an interpretation of the case, see 53 CoL L. REV. 1009 (1953).
36. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 80 (1953). The court
indicates that little weight should be given the seller's statements on cost justification.
Id. at 80 and n.24. Since there is no other way to prove actual knowledge, "the dis-
senters' fear that the FTC must prove what lay in a buyer's mind seems insubstantial."
53 Cor. L. REv. 1009, 1010 (1953).
37. See Brief for FTC, pp. 41-2, Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346
U.S. 61 (1953).
38. Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 76 (1953): "[I]t is that
element [of knowledge] about which the controversy here centers and to which we must
address ourselves."
39. Treble damage suitors have a cause of action under the Robinson-Patmau Act.
Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Ill. 1941). In treble
damage actions neither party has easier access to the seller's cost data. Therefore, on
Automatic Canteei's "balance of convenience" test, the plaintiff should have to introduce
no more than approximate cost data.
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NOTES
Since Automatic Canteen probably leaves considerable room for Robinson-
Patman enforcement against buyers,40 large purchasers may try to plan their
transactions to escape the Act. One such plan would rely on the defense
that prices may be set in good faith to meet the lower, lawful price of a com-
petitor.4 If a buyer informed his supplier of a lower offer by a competing
seller, the supplier might then be able lawfully to reduce his own price to
meet competition.4 2  Although a seller pro ,ably cannot meet an unlawful
lower price,43 courts have held that a seller's offer, even though not justified
by cost savings, does not violate the Robinson-Patman Act."4 However, the
offer-price distinction has only been applied in proceedings against sellers.
Such a device may encounter both legal and policy objections. A seller
can probably only meet a competitor's price to retain old business, not to
secure new business.45 And since the Act prohibits buyers from "inducing"
unlawful prices,46 soliciting an unjustified offer may be prohibited to vendees
even though sellers can legally make such offers. Furthermore, a court may
rule that the whole transaction lacks good faith.4 7 Since only the most power-
ful buyers could use the device, courts may view it as an instance of abusing
bargaining power which the Robinson-Patman Act, for all its infelicitous
draftsmanship, was designed to curb.48
40. The FTC is studying the record in the original proceeding against the Automatic
Canteen Company to determine what further courses of action are open. Communication
to the YALE LAW JoRINAL from Earl W. Kinter, General Counsel for the FTC, dated
Nov. 3, 1953, in Yale Law Library.
41. See note 4 supra.
42. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951). But a seller cannot
merely accept the buyer's statement; he must diligently check its truth. FTC v. Staley
Mlfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945).
For instances where this defense might have been used by the Automatic Canteen
Company, see Transcript of Record, pp. 95, 241, Automatic Canteen Co. of America v.
FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
43. See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 244 (1951). But see Dean Mill: Co.
v. American Processing & Sales Co., 1950-51 TRADE CAsEs 1 02,777 (N.D. Ill. 1951);
American Cooperative Serum Ass'n v. Anchor Serum Co., 153 F.2d 907, 912 (7th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 721 (1946). See Simon, Price Discrimination to Meet Cow-
petition, [1950] U. oF Iii. L. FoRaum 575, 538.
44. See, e.g., Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., CCH Trm.z R.,a:. R-r'. f .12.107
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), rev'd on other -grounds, 141 F2d 972 (2d Cir. 1944); A. J. Good-
man & Son, Inc. v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1949). But cf.
American Can Co. v. Bruce's Juices, Inc., 187 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1951).
45. Carpel Frosted Foods, Inc., CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 2213.303 (FTC order issued
Dec. 13, 1951) ; FTC v. Standard Brands, Inc., 1S9 F.2d 510, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1951).
46. See note 9 supra.
47. See FTC v. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759 (1945); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 250 (1951). The elements of "good faith" remain obscure. See Rowe,
Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another Looh at RJ'inson-Patinan,
60 YALE L.J. 929, 965-72 (1951) ; Simon, snpra note 43, at 56-90.
48. See PAruiAx', THE RosI soN-PA rA-x Acr 3-6, 343-58 (1938).
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